Missouri Law Review
Volume 87

Issue 3

Article 14

Summer 2022

Nightmare on High Street: The Haunting Effects of Voluntary
Arbitration in Nursing Home Administration
Taylor M. Harrington

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr

Recommended Citation
Taylor M. Harrington, Nightmare on High Street: The Haunting Effects of Voluntary Arbitration in Nursing
Home Administration, 87 MO. L. REV. (2022)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss3/14

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Harrington: Nightmare on High Street: The Haunting Effects of Voluntary Arbit

NOTE
Nightmare on High Street: The Haunting
Effects of Voluntary Arbitration in Nursing
Home Administration
Ingram v. Brook Chateau, 586 S.W.3d 772 (Mo. 2019).
Taylor M. Harrington*

I. INTRODUCTION
“Ring…Ring…Ring…” It is one o’clock in the morning. The buzz
of your phone wakes you from your sleep. You roll over and check to see
who could be calling at this hour. You do not recognize the number, but
you answer anyway. The words racing from the voice on the other end of
the line are too horrific to be true, but they are. Your dreams suddenly
turn into a real-life nightmare as you learn that your loved one waits in a
hospital room, fighting for their life. You rush to their bedside. You are
with them when they die. “How could this happen?” A nursing home is
supposed to be a place of safety. Yet the mysterious nature of your loved
one’s injuries leaves you with more questions than answers. Perplexed by
the circumstances surrounding their death, you hire a lawyer. While the
investigation reveals significant negligence by the nursing home, it also
reveals a signed voluntary arbitration agreement.1 The agreement holds
your signature. At the time, you assumed that it was just another piece of
paper required for admission. Now, with one pen stroke, your loved one’s
most fundamental guarantee, the right to a civil jury trial, has disappeared.
Arbitration provisions have become standard practice in employment
and consumer agreements. However, their place in nursing home
contracts is questionable.2 While claims related to employment or
*

B.A., University of Missouri, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2023; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2022–2023; Associate
Member, Missouri Law Review, 2021–2022. I am thankful to Professor Rafael Gely
for his feedback and support while writing this Note. I am also grateful to Missouri
Law Review for its assistance in the editing process.
1
A voluntary arbitration agreement, in this context, refers to an arbitration
agreement that is not required to obtain services.
2
John R. Schleppenbach, Something Old, Something New: Recent
Developments in the Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate Disputes Between
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consumer transactions often involve the loss of employment or income,
claims against nursing homes are typically much graver.3 Because these
claims commonly involve allegations of wrongful death, abuse, or neglect,
critics have argued that mandatory arbitration of nursing home claims is
against public policy.4 In response to these arguments, some nursing
homes have transitioned to voluntary arbitration agreements.5 However,
it is debatable how voluntary these agreements really are.
Issues relating to these voluntary provisions become magnified when
the individual consenting to the agreement is an agent acting on behalf of
a principal.6 When an agent mistakes a voluntary arbitration agreement to
be mandatory, the question becomes whether the agent held the requisite
authority to act. While several courts have limited the enforceability of
agreements under such circumstances,7 the Supreme Court of Missouri
recently declined to follow suit. In Ingram v. Brook Chateau, the court
held that an attorney in fact, i.e., an agent, had the implied authority to
enter into agreements incidental to the authority expressly granted in the
power of attorney, including voluntary arbitration agreements.8 This Note
argues that the court’s analysis was incomplete and thus concludes that the
court incorrectly held that tenets of agency law permit attorneys in fact to
enter into voluntary arbitration agreements on behalf of their principals
absent express authorization.
Part II of this Note provides the relevant facts, procedural
background, and holding of Ingram. Part III explores the legal background
surrounding powers of attorney and explains the role of agency law and
its application to power of attorney interpretation. Part IV discusses the
majority and dissenting opinions of Ingram. Finally, Part V analyzes the
soundness of the majority’s opinion from both a legal and public policy
standpoint. Because Missourians’ constitutional right to a jury should not
be implicitly revoked via proxy, this Note ultimately advocates for

Nursing Homes and Their Residents, 22 ELDER L.J. 141, 144 (2014) (citing Katherine
Palm, Arbitration Clauses in Nursing Home Admission Agreements: Framing the
Debate, 14 ELDER L.J. 453, 462–79 (2006)).
3
Id. at 151–52.
4
Id. at 144–45 (citing Katherine Palm, Arbitration Clauses in Nursing Home
Admission Agreements: Framing the Debate, 14 ELDER L.J. 453, 462–79 (2006)).
5
See, e.g., Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 580, 593 (Ky. 2012);
Ingram v. Brook Chateau, 586 S.W.3d 772, 774 (Mo. 2019).
6
Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to
his control, and consent by the other so to act. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
1 (AM. L. INST. 1958). The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal. Id. The
one who is to act is the agent. Id.
7
See, e.g., Ping, 376 S.W.3d at 591; Pine Tree Villa, LLC v. Brooker, 612 F.
App'x 340 (6th Cir. 2015).
8
Ingram, 586 S.W.3d at 776.
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legislative action that limits Ingram’s holding. This Note urges the
Missouri General Assembly to revise Missouri law to either: (1) permit
attorneys in fact to enter into voluntary arbitration agreements only if such
action is expressly authorized in the power of attorney agreements or (2)
expressly forbid such authorization altogether.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In November 2015, Theron Ingram (“Ingram”) was involved in a
motor vehicle accident that resulted in quadriplegia.9 Upon discharge
from the hospital, Ingram executed a written Durable Power of Attorney
(“DPOA”).10 The DPOA identified Andrea Nichole Hall (“Hall”) as
Ingram’s attorney in fact.11 The DPOA included a durability provision,12
an effective date provision,13 and an agent’s powers provision.14 The facts
of this case turned on the level of authority conferred to Hall by the
subsections of the agent’s powers provision, which expressly granted Hall
the power to: (A) “make all necessary arrangements for health care
services on [Ingram’s] behalf . . . ”; (B) “move [Ingram] into, or out of,
any health care or assisted living/residential care facility . . . ”; (C) take
any other necessary action as authorized in the DPOA; and (D) “receive
information regarding [Ingram’s] health care . . . .”15
When Ingram was discharged from the hospital in March 2016, he
was admitted into a residential care facility, Brook Chateau.16 As Ingram’s
attorney in fact, Hall executed the paperwork necessary for Ingram’s
admission into the facility.17 Among the admissions paperwork was a
document titled “Voluntary Arbitration Agreement” (“the Agreement”).18
The Agreement provided, in part, that: (1) any claims arising out of or
relating to the Agreement were subject to arbitration;19 (2) the Agreement
9

Id. at 773.
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. (The durability provision provided that the written agreement was “a
Durable Power of Attorney, and the authority of [Ingram’s] Agent, when effective,
shall not terminate or be void or voidable if [Ingram]…become[s] disabled or
incapacitated or in the event of later uncertainty as to whether [Ingram is]…dead or
alive.”).
13
Id. (The effective date provision provided that the DPOA was “effective
immediately and continues if [Ingram becomes] incapacitated and unable to make and
communicate a health-care decision as certified by two physicians.”).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
10
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could be canceled within thirty days of admission into the facility;20 (3)
the Agreement was binding on all parties and party affiliates;21 and (4) all
parties agreed that consent to the Agreement constituted a health care
decision.22 Furthermore, the opening clause of the Agreement stated: “The
parties are waiving their right to a trial before a judge or jury of any dispute
between them. Please read carefully before signing. The patient will
receive services in this center whether or not this agreement is signed.”23
Despite the latter exemption, Hall executed the Agreement.24
In February 2018, Ingram brought suit against Brook Chateau.25
Ingram alleged negligence, claiming that support staff at Brook Chateau
failed to properly turn him where his quadriplegic state left him unable to
turn himself.26 Ingram argued that the staff’s failure resulted in pressure
ulcers and other wounds, causing him significant pain and suffering.27 In
response to Ingram’s claims, Brook Chateau filed a motion to dismiss and
compel arbitration according to the Agreement.28 After reviewing the
evidence, the circuit court overruled Brook Chateau's motion,29 and Brook
Chateau appealed. The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District
affirmed.30 Pursuant to Section 435.440, Brook Chateau filed for
interlocutory appeal,31 and the Supreme Court of Missouri granted
transfer.32
Ingram argued to the Supreme Court that the DPOA did not grant
Hall the authority to execute the Agreement.33 Specifically, Ingram
contended that Hall had the authority only to “make all necessary
arrangements for health care services on [Ingram’s] behalf.”34 Thus,
Ingram reasoned that, because the Agreement was voluntary and not
necessary for admission to Brook Chateau, Hall did not have the authority
to execute the Agreement under the DPOA.35 The Supreme Court of
20

Id.
Id.
22
Id. at 744.
23
Id. (Russell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); Brief for Appellant at 13,
Ingram v. Brook Chateau, 586 S.W.3d 772 (Mo. 2019) (en banc) (No. SC 97812).
24
Ingram, 586 S.W.3d at 773.
25
Id. at 774.
26
Brief for Appellant, supra note 23, at 13.
27
Ingram, 586 S.W.3d at 774; Brief for Appellant, supra note 23, at 13.
28
Ingram, 586 S.W.3d at 774.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.; Section 435.440 permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying
an application to compel arbitration. MO. REV. STAT. § 435.440 (2003).
32
Ingram, 586 S.W.3d at 774.
33
Id. at 775.
34
Id.
35
Id.
21
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Missouri disagreed, however, and held that relevant Missouri law
“obligated the circuit court to order the parties to proceed to arbitration”
because “the Agreement was signed by Hall on behalf of Ingram pursuant
to Hall's authority established by the DPOA.”36

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The relevant history of arbitration in the United States begins with
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Since the FAA’s enactment, the
Supreme Court of the United States has significantly expanded its scope.37
FAA expansion has led to questionable outcomes in some context,
including the enforcement of arbitration agreements that are signed by
attorneys in fact, pursuant to a power of attorney.38 When an attorney in
fact signs a document on behalf of the principal, the question becomes
whether the attorney in fact had the authority to do so.39 While there is
some ambiguity in the way courts address this question, Missouri law and
the Restatement (Second) of Agency provide direction on when an agent
may reasonably take legal action under these circumstances.40 Further,
other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue provide similar guidance.

A. Development and Operation of Arbitration in the United States
The FAA was enacted in 1925.41 Generally, the FAA mandates that
arbitration clauses be deemed presumptively valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable.42 Some have argued that Congress intended for the FAA to
apply only to contracts between businesspersons—as opposed to contracts
involving consumers.43 However, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the
United States Supreme Court opted to implicitly extend the scope of the
FAA to consumer contracts.44 Many states have attempted to limit this

36

Id. at 776.
See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
38
See, e.g., Ingram, 586 S.W.3d at 774 (Mo. 2019).
39
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c.
40
See id. § 33–35; id. § 39.
41
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339 .
42
Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P'ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017).
43
See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343–45, 350; 9 U.S.C. § 2 (stating that the FAA
applies to contracts “evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”); see also
Margaret L. Moses, How the Supreme Court's Misconstruction of the FAA has
Affected Consumers, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (“Supporters of the Act
made clear in Congressional Hearings the limited nature of the Act. It would not apply
to workers, almost all of whom were considered at that time not to be in interstate
commerce, and it would not apply in merchant-to-consumer transactions, only in
merchant-to-merchant transactions.”).
44
See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351.
37
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expansion, particularly in the nursing home context, by enacting
legislation that prohibits the enforceability of arbitration clauses in some
cases.45 However, the Supreme Court has made clear that these laws are
preempted by the FAA and therefore unenforceable,46 leaving plaintiffs
with no choice but to proceed with arbitration.
Arbitration is a type of alternative dispute resolution where disputes
between parties are resolved privately by an arbitrator rather than publicly
by a judge or jury.47 Similar to judges and juries, an arbitrator can review
the evidence and hear testimony by the parties prior to deciding the
outcome.48 However, arbitration is not bound by the traditional rules of
evidence used by the courts, so the tools of discovery are extremely
limited.49 As noted by the United States Supreme Court, “the factfinding
process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial factfinding,”50
and, in many cases, this limited factfinding can harm the outcome of the
case.51 As a policy matter, arbitration outcomes are generally binding and
final.52 To protect the integrity of the arbitration system, decisions made
by an arbitrator are rarely, if ever, overturned on appeal.53 This is true
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1939 (2013) (“[a]ny party to an action
brought under this section shall be entitled to a trial by jury and any waiver of the right
to a trial by a jury, whether oral or in writing, prior to the commencement of an action,
shall be null and void, and without legal force or effect.”); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/3606 (2013) (“[a]ny waiver by a resident or his legal representative of the right to
commence an action under [the state’s Nursing Home Care Act], whether oral or in
writing, shall be null and void, and without legal force or effect.”); W.VA. CODE § 165C-15(e) (2013) (“[a]ny waiver by a resident or his or her legal representative of the
right to commence an action under this section, whether oral or in writing, shall be
null and void as contrary to public policy.”).
46
Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P'ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017) (“The
FAA . . . preempts any state rule discriminating on its face against arbitration—for
example, a ‘law prohibit[ing] outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim . . .
[and] [t]he Act also displaces any rule that covertly accomplishes the same objective
by disfavoring contracts that (oh so coincidentally) have the defining features of
arbitration agreements.”) (citations omitted).
47
JAMS Arbitration Services, Arbitration Defined: What is Arbitration?,
JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration-defined/ [https://perma.cc/58D7-EZ9Z]
(last visited Apr. 22, 2022).
48
Id.
49
Paul Radvany, The Importance of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
Arbitration, 36 REV. LITIG. 469, 505 (2016).
50
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57–58, (1974) (rather, “[t]he
record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do
not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery,
compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often severely
limited or unavailable.”).
51
See Radvany, supra note 49 at 506.
52
Arbitration Defined: What is Arbitration?, supra note 47.
53
See Radvany, supra note 49 at 506.
45
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even when an arbitrator fails to justify her decision with any conclusion of
law or fact, as arbitrators are not required to provide any justification for
their decisions.54 In some contexts, it thus follows that arbitration provides
effectively no protection for its “litigants” against an arbitrator’s
potentially erroneous decision.55 Such an outcome becomes extremely
troublesome when consent to arbitrate in the first place is implicitly placed
in the hands of a third party, such as an attorney in fact or other agent.

B. History of Powers of Attorney
A power of attorney is a legal document that authorizes one person
to act as the agent for another, typically the executor of the document. 56
Generally, because a power of attorney is a legal manifestation of an
individual’s intent to designate an agent, common law principles of agency
apply to the document.57 Agency is defined as a legal relationship
established when one person – known as the “principal” – manifests assent
to another person – known as the “agent” – to act on the principal’s behalf
and subject to the principal’s control.58 Therefore, the agent may act only
within the scope of her authority as granted by the principal.59
Because an agent only has the authority to act subject to the
principal’s control, an agent’s authority at common law ceased to exist
upon the incapacitation or death of the principal.60 Since then, however,
many states, including Missouri, have recognized the limitations to
automatic termination of authority and codified what is known as the
DPOA.61 A DPOA is a specialized power of attorney in which the
“authority of the attorney in fact does not terminate in the event the
principal becomes disabled or incapacitated.”62 In Missouri, the creation

54

American Arbitration Association, A Guide for Commercial Arbitrators,
NEUTRALS ECENTER 13, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/
A%20Guide%20for%20Commercial%20Arbitrators.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EH54AEDV].
55
See generally Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57–58.
56
Power of Attorney, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
57
See generally American Bar Association, Estate Planning FAQs: Power of
Attorney, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (last visited Apr. 22, 2022),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/real_property_trust_estate/resources/estate_pla
nning/power_of_attorney/ [https://perma.cc/B7L4-D8JT].
58
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (the individual
appointed to act as the legal agent of a principal in a power of attorney is referred to
as the “attorney in fact”).
59
Id. § 1.01 cmt. c.
60
Id. § 122.
61
See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 404.705 (2016).
62
Id. § 404.703 (2016).
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of a DPOA depends on the parties’ adherence to specific requirements.63
DPOAs are used frequently in cases of medical and disability estate
planning.64

C. Authority and Duties of an Agent
The duties of an agent stem from three possible sources: (1) the
state’s power of attorney statute; (2) the language of the power of attorney
itself; and (3) common law principles of agency, so long as the principles
are consistent with the state statute and language of the document.65 Under
Missouri Code Section 404.710.6, an attorney in fact’s authority to
perform certain duties – such as execute, amend, or revoke a trust
agreement or fund a trust with the principal’s assets when the principal did
not create the trust – must be specifically and expressly stated in the
document.66 By contrast, Section 404.710.7 prohibits a principal from
extending authority to an attorney in fact for the performance of certain
duties, even when expressly granted in the power of attorney.67 Section
404.710.7 denies an attorney in fact the authority to make or amend a
principal’s will or take any action that is expressly prohibited by the
principal.68 If the authority a principal seeks to confer does not fall within
the scope of sections 404.710.6 or 404.710.7, the attorney in fact holds the
license to act only as granted by the language of the power of attorney.69

63

Id. § 404.705 (2003) (A durable power of attorney may only be created in
Missouri if it (1) is in writing, (2) carries the title of durable power of attorney, (3)
contains a notice of its continuing effect during incapacity, (4) is signed by the
principal, (5) is dated, and (6) is acknowledged before a notary.).
64
Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney's Place in the Family of
Fiduciary Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001).
65
Linda S. Whitton, Understanding Duties and Conflicts of Interest – A Guide
for the Honorable Agent, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1037, 1040 (2013).
66
MO. REV. STAT. § 404.710.6 (2016) (“Any power of attorney may grant power
of authority to an attorney in fact to carry out any of the following actions if the actions
are expressly authorized in the power of attorney . . . .”).
67
Id. § 404.710.7 (“No power of attorney, whether durable or not durable, and
whether or not it delegates general powers, may delegate or grant power or authority
to an attorney in fact to do or carry out any of the following actions for the principal:
(1) To make, publish, declare, amend or revoke a will for the principal; (2) To make,
execute, modify or revoke a living will declaration for the principal; (3) To require the
principal, against his or her will, to take any action or to refrain from taking any action;
or (4) To carry out any actions specifically forbidden by the principal while not under
any disability or incapacity.”).
68
Id.
69
Id. § 404.714.7 (“An attorney in fact shall exercise authority granted by the
principal in accordance with the instrument setting forth the power of attorney . . . .”).
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Before 1989, Missouri law required powers of attorney to enumerate
authority with specificity.70 However, modern law allows “[a] principal
[to] delegate to an attorney in fact . . . general powers to act in a fiduciary
capacity.”71 The power conferred under these general grants of authority
is limited to only that which is necessary to achieve the goals of the
expressed subjects in the power of attorney.72 Stated differently, an
attorney in fact is “authorized to do, and to do only, what it is reasonable
for him to infer that the principal desires him to do in the light of the
principal’s manifestations and the facts as he knows or should know them
at the time he acts.”73 A third party who deals with an attorney in fact may
freely rely on these general powers without regard to whether the power
of attorney authorizes the act with specificity.74 However, this rule is not
without limitation, as fiduciary duties associated with agency significantly
limit general grants of authority.75 Generally, an attorney in fact has a duty
to act prudently, in good faith, and in accordance with the principal’s
instructions and best interest.76

D. Authority Under Power of Attorney
When interpreting the authority conferred by a power of attorney, a
court should interpret it in light of the surrounding circumstances,
including the formality or informality with which the document was
executed.77 Usually, powers of attorney are drafted by lawyers with
specialized skills and the ability to articulate the principal’s intent “with a
high degree of particularity.”78 When executed in this manner, a power of
attorney is deemed a formal document and presumed to express the
principal’s intent with specificity.79 Such a presumption, however, does
70
Durable Power of Attorney, MISSOURI LEGAL SERVICES (Feb. 17, 2020),
https://www.lsmo.org/node/57/durable-power-attorney
[https://perma.cc/YEN4CC5X] (“Prior to 1989, a valid power of attorney had to spell out in detail all of the
authorizations granted to the agent.”).
71
Id. § 404.710.1 (emphasis added) (“A principal may delegate to an attorney
in fact in a power of attorney general powers to act in a fiduciary capacity on the
principal's behalf with respect to all lawful subjects and purposes or with respect to
one or more express subjects or purposes. A power of attorney with general powers
may be durable or not durable.”).
72
Id.
73
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 33 (AM. L. INST. 1958).
74
MO. REV. STAT. § 404.710.8 (2016).
75
Id. § 404.714.1 (2016).
76
Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 39 (AM. L. INST. 1958) (“Unless
otherwise agreed, authority to act as agent includes only authority to act for the benefit
of the principal.”).
77
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 34(e) (AM. L. INST. 1958).
78
Id. § 34, cmt. h.
79
Id.
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not require that the power of attorney be construed strictly.80 Rather, the
presumption assumes that any construction will be fair and carry out the
principal’s intent.81
Missouri courts have, on some occasions, applied strict construction
to powers of attorney.82 For example, in In re Estate of Lambur, the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District held that powers of
attorney are to be strictly construed.83 The question before the court was
whether an attorney in fact was permitted to gift to herself the principal’s
property upon the principal’s death.84 The authority to make an “at-death
gift” was not expressly authorized in the power of attorney.85 Rather, the
attorney in fact was authorized to make inter vivos gifts of the principal’s
property to herself.86 Relying on Section 404.710.6(3) – which requires
express authorization – the court stated that “[t]he law is clear that powers
of attorney are to be strictly construed.”87 Therefore, according to the
court, “in order for an attorney-in-fact to make a gift to herself of the
principal’s property, she must be expressly authorized to do so in the
power of attorney.”88 Thus, the court concluded that the power of attorney
did not authorize at-death gifts because the gifting authority was expressly
limited to inter vivos gifts.89
In contrast to Lambur and similar cases – where the attorney’s action
fell within the scope of Section 404.710.6 – Missouri courts have not
expressly held that powers of attorney be strictly construed when the
authority delegated is for an act that falls outside Section 404.710.6.90 In
cases where strict construction is not possible or reasonably required,
authority may be inferred.91 Generally, the authority to act includes the
authority to perform acts that are incidental, usually accompany, or are
reasonably necessary to accomplish the act with which power was
expressly granted.92 Under these circumstances, authority may be

80

Id.
Id.
82
E.g., In re Est. of Lambur, 397 S.W.3d 54, 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (“Powers
of attorney are to be strictly construed.”).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.; See id. at 67.
86
Id. at 57; See id. at 67. An inter vivos gift refers to a transfer or gift given to
someone while both the giver and the receiver are alive.
87
Id. at 67.
88
Id. (emphasis in original).
89
Id.
90
See, e.g., Mercantile Tr. Co., N.A. v. Harper, 622 S.W.2d 345, 350 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981).
91
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 35 (AM. L. INST. 1958).
92
Id.
81
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inferred.93 One exception to this rule provides that “dangerous powers”
may not be inferred absent evidence to support an intent to include such
action.94 While courts have not expressly defined “dangerous powers,” a
Michigan court noted that an interpretation that permits an agent
“unlimited discretion” over a matter directly affecting the principal likely
constitutes a dangerous power.95

E. Voluntary Agreements and Powers of Attorney in Nursing Home
Contracts
Similar to Ingram v. Brook Chateau, other courts have directly
addressed the question of whether a DPOA – which expressly authorizes
the attorney in fact to do only what is necessary for the principal’s health
care – confers an attorney in fact the power to enter into voluntary
arbitration agreements.96 In 2012, for example, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky decided Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc.97 In this case, Donna
Ping served as her mother’s attorney in fact under a DPOA.98 In this
capacity, Ms. Ping signed several documents pursuant to her mother’s
admission to the Golden Living Center, a nursing home in Kentucky.99
When her mother died due to injuries allegedly sustained in the nursing
home, Ms. Ping brought a wrongful death claim against Beverly
Enterprises, the care facility’s operator.100
Beverly Enterprises filed a motion to stay the proceedings pending
arbitration, citing an arbitration agreement that Ms. Ping signed in
conjunction with her mother’s admission to the facility.101 The language
of the power of attorney authorized Ms. Ping “to do and perform any, all,
and every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be

93

See id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 34, cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 1958); see,
e.g., Carlson v. Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Cleveland, No. 36946, 1978 WL
217774, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1978); Est. of Collins v. U.S., No. 93-CV70151-DT, 1994 WL 464357, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 23, 1994).
95
See generally Est. of Collins, at *3, n.1 (“A power to make gifts can be found
in paragraph 12 of the instrument only if that provision is read to grant the agent
unlimited discretion in the use of the principal's funds. Such “dangerous” powers will
not be inferred.” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 35, cmt. h (AM. L.
INST. 1958))).
96
See e.g., Genesis Healthcare, LLC v. Stevens, 544 S.W.3d 645, 651–52 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2017) (holding that the relevant DPOA did not grant the attorney in fact
power to institute and defend actions on behalf the of the DPOA’s principal).
97
Ping v. Beverly Enter., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 588 (Ky. 2012).
98
Id. at 586.
99
Id. at 586 n.1.
100
Id. at 586.
101
Id.
94
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done . . . .”102 Beverly Enterprises argued that the power of attorney’s
language granted Ms. Ping the authority to sign the arbitration
agreement,103 but the Supreme Court of Kentucky disagreed.104 The court
held that Ms. Ping lacked both actual and implied authority to enter into
the agreement.105 While the power of attorney provided for a general grant
of authority, the court noted that the general authority related only to acts
that were “requisite and necessary,” as opposed to acts that were merely
suggested or recommended.106 Thus, the court determined that authority
under the power of attorney should be limited to acts that were “reasonably
necessary” to maintain the principal’s health care.107 The court stated that
“[a]bsent authorization in the power of attorney to settle claims and
disputes or some such express authorization addressing dispute
resolution,” an agent does not encompass the power to waive a “principal’s
right to seek redress of grievances in a court of law.”108 Beverly
Enterprises argued in the alternative that the arbitration agreement was
incidental to the principal’s health care and suggested that principles of
implied authority should govern.109 However, the court reiterated that the
arbitration agreement was optional and held that implied authority may not
be inferred where an agreement is not required for admission and is merely
incidental to health care decisions.110
Other courts have similarly declined to compel arbitration where a
voluntary arbitration agreement was presented in conjunction with health
care documents.111 For example, the Sixth Circuit recently held that an
agreement is not a necessary health care decision where it was not a
precondition for admission to a facility.112 And thus, the authority granted
102

Id.
Id. at 590.
104
Id. at 591.
105
Id. at 594.
106
Id. at 592.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 593.
109
Id. at 594.
110
Id. at 593 (holding that “where, as here, the arbitration agreement is not a
condition of admission to the nursing home, but is an optional, collateral agreement…
[the] authority to choose arbitration is not within the purview of a health-care agency,
since in that circumstance agreeing to arbitrate is not a ‘health care’ decision.”).
111
See, e.g., Texas Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v. Fryer, 227 S.W.3d 345, 352 (Tex.
App. 2007) (concluding that a health care power attorney did not “confer authority on
[the agent] to make legal, as opposed to health care, decisions for [the principal], such
as whether to waive [the] right to a jury trial by agreeing to arbitration”); Estate of
Irons ex rel. Springer v. Arcadia Health Care, L.C., 66 So.3d 396, 400 (Fla. Ct. App.
2011) (declining to compel arbitration); Life Care Centers of America v. Smith, 681
S.E.2d 182, 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (upholding trial court’s refusal to compel
arbitration on the basis of a broad POA).
112
Pine Tree Villa, LLC v. Brooker, 612 F.App'x 340, 345 (6th Cir. 2015).
103
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by powers of attorney in these situations does not include the power to
submit to arbitration.113

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The ultimate issue in Ingram was whether the Agent’s Power
provision – which granted Hall the authority to make arrangements
necessary for Ingram’s health care and take any other action necessary to
execute the duties stated within the DPOA – conferred to Hall the authority
to execute agreements that were incidental, but not necessary, to the duties
expressly stated in the DPOA.114 Using principles of agency law, the
majority determined that the express language of the provision allowed
Hall to execute incidental, unnecessary agreements.115 It reasoned that
such authority is construed to apply to acts that are incidental to or are
reasonably necessary to achieve the expressed intent, unless otherwise
agreed.116 In contrast, the dissent questioned whether agency law was
applicable in the instant case and noted that, even if it was, the language
should not be so broadly construed as to include the authorization of
incidental, unnecessary agreements.117

A. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion determined that, notwithstanding the authority
conferred by the “necessary arrangements” provision, Hall had express
and actual authority to move Ingram into a care facility.118 It was from
this authority, the majority argued, that Hall’s power to sign the
Agreement was derived.119 In coming to this determination, the majority
relied on Sections 33 and 35 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.120
Section 35 provides that “[u]nless otherwise agreed, authority to conduct
a transaction includes authority to do acts which are incidental to it, usually
accompany it, or are reasonably necessary to accomplish it.”121 Section 33
operates as a limitation to Section 35 and provides that, notwithstanding
Section 35, “[a]n agent is authorized to do, and to do only, what it is
reasonable for him to infer that the principal desires him to do in the light
of the principal’s manifestations and the facts as he knows or should know

113

See id. at 344.
Ingram v. Brook Chateau, 586 S.W.3d 772, 775 (Mo. 2019).
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 777 (Russell, J., dissenting).
118
Id. at 775.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 776.
121
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 35 (AM. L. INST. 1958).
114
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them at the time he acts.”122 First, the court noted that admissions
documents, which are to be signed prior to patient entry, are a “natural
part” of a residential care facility’s admission process and commonly
presented in conjunction with arbitration agreements.123 Then, applying
Sections 33 and 35, the court held that Hall’s express authority to move
Ingram into a care facility collaterally provided Hall the authority to sign
admissions documents on Ingram’s behalf.124
The majority also rejected the dissent’s argument that power granted
under a DPOA does not extend to acts that may typically be covered by
the implied authority doctrine.125 Relying on Section 404.710.8, which
allows a third party to freely rely on general grants of authority,126 the
majority concluded that there were no limitations in the application of
implied authority as to DPOAs.127 The majority then reiterated that the
DPOA expressly authorized Hall to move Ingram into a residential care
facility.128 In light of that authorization, the majority held that the signing
of the Agreement was purely incidental to the DPOA’s express purpose.129

B. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion categorized its argument into three main
points.130 First, the dissent argued that the majority improperly applied,
and relied on, agency principles to interpret authority under the power of
attorney.131 Second, the dissent argued that the majority erred in its broad
application of Section 35.132 Third, the dissent argued that the majority
erred in its factual application of Section 33.133
As a preliminary matter, the dissent noted that an attorney in fact may
only act in accordance with the authority set out in the power of
attorney.134 The dissent then reasoned that the express language of the
power of attorney – authorizing Hall to do that which was necessary for
Ingram’s health care – collaterally prohibited Hall from entering into
122

Id. § 33.
Ingram, 586 S.W.3d at 776.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 775.
126
MO. REV. STAT. § 404.710.8 (2003); see also supra text accompanying note
123

74.
127

Ingram, 586 S.W.3d at 775.
Id. at 776.
129
Id. at 775.
130
Id. at 778–79 (Russell, J., dissenting).
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 779 (Russell, J., dissenting).
134
Id. at 778 (Russell, J., dissenting) (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 404.714.7
(2003)).
128
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unnecessary agreements like the Voluntary Arbitration Agreement.135 In
its criticism of the majority’s sua sponte application of agency law, the
dissent contended that “the terms of the agreement entered into by the
parties necessarily govern over general agency principles.”136 On these
grounds, the dissent concluded that Hall did not have the authority to sign
the Agreement.137
The dissent also claimed that, even if agency principles were
applicable, the majority’s broad application of Section 35 was improper.138
The dissent argued that Section 35’s application is limited to incidental
transactions that are necessary to complete the authorized objective stated
in the power of attorney.139 The dissent pointed out that Hall could have
accomplished Ingram’s expressed intent – to be moved into a residential
care facility – without signing the Agreement.140 In furtherance of this
point, the dissent cited to Lambur, which noted that powers of attorney are
to be strictly construed.141
Lastly, relying on a black letter statement of Section 33,142 the dissent
noted that nothing in the power of attorney indicated an intent to allow
Hall to enter into unnecessary agreements.143 The dissent argued that
authorization to move an individual in or out of a health care facility does
not translate to an authorization, incidental or otherwise, to waive that
individual’s right to a trial by judge or jury.144

V. COMMENT
The majority’s sua sponte application of agency principles did not
paint a clear picture of the breadth of agency law and its application to
power-of-attorney interpretation. Rather, the majority omitted pertinent
principles of agency that would logically guide the court to a decision in
the alternative. While the dissent’s “strict construction” argument is
135

Id.
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 778–79; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 35 (AM. L. INST. 1958)
(“Unless otherwise agreed, authority to conduct a transaction includes authority to do
acts which are incidental to it, usually accompany it, or are reasonably necessary to
accomplish it.”).
139
Ingram, 586 S.W.3d at n.4.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 779 (Russell, J., dissenting).
142
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §33 (AM. L. INST. 1958) (“‘An agent is
authorized to do, and to do only, what it is reasonable for him to infer that the principal
desires him to do in the light of the principal's manifestations and the facts as he knows
or should know them at the time he acts.’”) (emphasis added).
143
Ingram, 586 S.W.3d at 779. (Russell, J., dissenting).
144
Id.
136
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similarly limited, its approach would have led to a more appropriate
outcome in this case. Both opinions ultimately failed to recognize the
fiduciary duties owed by an attorney in fact. As a matter of first
impression, the court also failed to consider how other jurisdictions have
approached this same issue. Had the Ingram court heeded these principles,
it could have avoided the haunting effects now facing Missouri citizens.

A. Strict Construction
The Ingram majority and dissenting opinions ultimately disagreed
about the circumstances under which powers of attorney must be strictly
construed.145 The dissent stated that, generally, powers of attorney should
be narrowly interpreted.146 In contrast, the majority suggested, in dicta,
that powers of attorney will only be strictly construed when the attorney
in fact’s action requires express authority under Section 404.710.6.147
While both approaches have some legal merit, they both are similarly
flawed.
First, the dissent’s suggestion fails to recognize that Missouri
common law has only required strict construction where an act falls under
Section 404.710.6. Likewise, the Missouri General Assembly has never
required that powers of attorney be strictly interpreted outside of Section
404.710.6. The General Assembly’s hesitance to formally require narrow
construction is supported by comment h to Section 34 of the Restatement,
which recommends that “[t]here . . . be neither a ‘strict’ nor a ‘liberal’
interpretation, but a fair construction which carries out the intent as
expressed.”148 Thus, the dissent’s assessment that powers of attorney be
narrowly construed is fair only to the extent the act in question is one for
which the legislature has required express authorization.149
Second, the majority’s suggestion to totally abandon principles of
strict construction absent any legislative requirement goes too far and fails
to consider interpretative guidance provided by the Restatement (Second)
of Agency. Specifically, the majority failed to consider that an analysis of
145

Id.
Id.
147
Id. at 775.
148
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 34, cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 1958).
149
Ingram v. Brook Chateau, 586 S.W.3d 772, 775 (Mo. 2019) (“The dissenting
opinion cites In re Estate of Lambur, 397 S.W.3d 54, 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) to
support that powers of attorney are to be strictly construed and therefore, attorneys in
fact cannot have implied authority under a durable power of attorney. However, a
strict construction does not preclude implied authority to act, as demonstrated by §
404.710.6(1)-(12).”). See MO. REV. STAT. § 404.710.6 (2003) (listing actions that
require express authorization in a power of attorney); see also id. § 404.710.7 (listing
actions that, even when expressly stated in a power of attorney, may not be conferred
via power of attorney).
146
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the document’s plain language is critical to carry out the principal’s intent.
The majority also erred when it did not consider the circumstances
surrounding the creation of the power of attorney, including the formality
under which it was executed. These omissions are in direct conflict with
Section 34. Consequently, had the majority considered the factors detailed
in Section 34, the court’s decision would likely be different.
Section 34, comment h, suggests that powers of attorney should be
“construed so as to carry out the intent of the principal.”150 Further,
Section 34 requires that powers of attorney be interpreted in light of the
formality with which they are drawn.151 With Section 34 in mind, one
could reasonably conclude that Ingram’s intent was to grant Hall authority
to carry out only matters necessary for health care. There is limited, if
any, evidence to support a holding that Ingram intended to authorize Hall
to enter into agreements that were unnecessary to obtain health care
services. Indeed, the only relevant mention of legal authority permitted
Hall to grant waivers of liability only when required by the health care
provider.152 The authority to sign such a waiver was coupled with a
provision that allowed Hall to take legal action at the expense of Ingram’s
estate.153 These provisions standing alone suggest that Hall’s authority to
waive legal liability was limited to circumstances in which doing so was
required for admission into the facility. Where such waiver was not
required to obtain health care, Hall had the authority to litigate rather than
to arbitrate.
Moreover, a power of attorney is a formal document which is
presumed to articulate the principal’s intent “with a high degree of
particularity.”154 Therefore, it is likely that Ingram intended to grant Hall
the authority to take action, including legal action, only where necessary
or required. Nothing in the power of attorney strongly supports the
assumption that Ingram intended to grant Hall the authority to enter into
unnecessary agreements, like the Voluntary Arbitration Agreement.155
Rather, Ingram’s power of attorney, when presumed to articulate his intent
with particularity, clearly demonstrated that Ingram did not intend – and
thus did not authorize – Hall to forgo Ingram’s legal right to trial by judge
or jury.

150

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 34, cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 1958).
Id. § 34.
152
Ingram v. Brook Chateau, 586 S.W.3d 772, 773 (Mo. 2019) (emphasis
added).
153
Id.
154
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 34, cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 1958).
155
Ingram, 586 S.W.3d at 773.
151
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B. Fiduciary Duties and Dangerous Powers
“The heart of agency law is often thought to lie in the fiduciary duties
that agency law mandates agents owe their principals.”156 And yet, the
Ingram court failed to fully consider the implications of these duties.157
The majority glossed over this duty by burying reference to it in the middle
of its recitation of agency law,158 and the dissent made no mention of it at
all.159 Notwithstanding the court’s omission, Section 404.714.1 makes
clear that Hall had a duty as Ingram’s attorney in fact to act for the benefit,
and in the interest, of Ingram.160 However, it is questionable whether Hall
fulfilled this duty.
Historically, jury trials are the best forum for plaintiffs to bring claims
against residential care facilities.161 By contrast, binding arbitration is the
forum preferred by most residential care defendants.162 Over the years,
defendants have seen exponential growth in liability costs associated with
litigation.163 Looking for ways to keep these costs low, defendants have
opted for arbitration.164 For defendants, arbitration provides a forum
where the likelihood of liability is minimized.165 This means a lower rate
156

Gabriel Rauterberg, The Essential Roles of Agency Law, 118 MICH. L. REV.
609, 641 (2020).
157
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 404.710.8, 404.714.1 (2003) (“An attorney in fact who
elects to act under a power of attorney is under a duty to act in the interest of the
principal.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 39 (AM. L. INST. 1958) (“Unless
otherwise agreed, authority to act as agent includes only authority to act for the benefit
of the principal.”); Id. § 39, cmt. h (“Authority is conferred to carry out the purposes
of the principal and not those of someone else.”).
158
Ingram, 586 S.W.3d at 775 (Mo. 2019).
159
Id. at 776–80.
160
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 404.710.8, 404.714.1 (2003) (“An attorney in fact who
elects to act under a power of attorney is under a duty to act in the interest of the
principal.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 39 (AM. L. INST. 1958) (“Unless
otherwise agreed, authority to act as agent includes only authority to act for the benefit
of the principal.”); Id. (“Unless otherwise agreed, authority to act as agent includes
only authority to act for the benefit of the principal.”).
161
See generally Michelle Andrews, Signing a Mandatory Arbitration
Agreement with a Nursing Home Can be Troublesome, WASH. POST: HEALTH AND
SCIENCE, (Sep. 17, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/signing-a-mandatory-arbitration-agreement-with-a-nursing-home-can-betroublesome/2012/09/16/ccf851ba-6a2c-11e1-acc6-32fefc7ccd67_story.html
[https://perma.cc/83PJ-VP4K].
162
See Ann E. Krasuski, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Do Not
Belong in Nursing Home Contracts with Residents, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
263, 267 (2004) (noting that “Arbitration offers nursing homes a number of
advantages over litigation”).
163
Andrews, supra note 161.
164
Id.
165
Id.
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of success for plaintiffs.166 Moreover, even when successful, plaintiffs
subject to arbitration often receive lower payouts than those who
litigate.167 These lower rates can likely be attributed to the narrow range
of discovery options available in arbitration.
Because one goal of arbitration is to keep costs low, the tools of
discovery are extremely limited.168 Under traditional evidentiary rules,
plaintiffs are much more likely to collect the breadth of evidence needed
to support their claims.169 On the other hand, limited discovery tools in
arbitration often reduce a plaintiff’s ability to make a compelling case. 170
And because arbitration decisions are almost always final and binding,
arbitration plaintiffs have virtually no right to overturn erroneous
decisions stemming from a lack of evidence.171 Further, the confidentiality
of arbitration is enticing for defendants who “prefer to know in advance
that their disputes will be determined out of the public gaze.”172
Traditional litigation protects plaintiffs and creates accountability for
defendants by providing a public record that can help transform industry
practice.173
In Ingram, Hall had a duty to act in the interest and benefit of
Ingram.174 Hall’s authority also extended only to acts that “carry out the
purposes of the principal and not those of someone else.”175 But research
shows that, despite the benefit of efficiency, the arbitration of residential
care facility claims is commonly to the detriment of the plaintiff.176 By
signing the Agreement, Hall subjected Ingram to the many risks associated
with arbitration and conferred to Brook Chateau the benefits of arbitration.
Therefore, Hall’s act appears to violate her fiduciary duty, as it was in
direct opposition of her duty to act for the benefit of Ingram. Under this
theory alone, the court could have invalidated the voluntary arbitration
agreement as a violation of Hall’s fiduciary duty to Ingram.
Whether due to mere oversight or an intentional avoidance, the
majority attempted to shadow Hall’s violation by arguing that the
166

Id.
Id. (“[N]early 12 percent of claims without arbitration agreements resulted in
awards of $250,000 or more, compared with 8.5 percent of claims with arbitration
agreements.”).
168
Paul Radvany, The Importance of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
Arbitration, 36 REV. LITIG. 469, 505 (2016); JAY GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION § 6:2 (4th ed. 2021).
169
See generally GRENIG, supra note 168.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
David St. John Sutton, et. al., RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION § 1:5 (23d ed. 2009).
173
Andrews, supra note 161.
174
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 404.710.8, 404.714.1 (2003).
175
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 39, cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1958).
176
Andrews, supra note 161.
167
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voluntary arbitration agreement was incidental to the authority granted to
Hall to do what was necessary for Ingram’s health care.177 However,
“dangerous powers” may not be incidentally inferred unless there is
evidence to support such an intent.178
Toeing the line of
unconstitutionality, it can hardly be argued that forced arbitration –
especially when authorized by proxy – is not a dangerous power.179
While constitutional rights, including the right to a civil jury trial,
may be waived,180 such waivers cannot be easily inferred.181 Waiver of
constitutional rights may only be found when the intent to do so is clear.182
In Ingram, the court held that Hall had the incidental authority to waive
Ingram’s constitutional right to a civil jury trial.183 However, guidance
from the Supreme Court of the United States on constitutional waiver calls
the Ingram holding into question.184 In Ingram, there was very limited
evidence of Ingram’s intent to confer to Hall the authority to enter into the
Agreement.185 Incidental agency principles alone demonstrate that Ingram
likely did not intend to confer such authority, and the plain language of the
power of attorney further emphasizes Ingram’s intent to grant Hall the
authority only to take necessary actions. At the very least, it is not clear
that Ingram intended to authorize Hall to enter into voluntary agreements.
As a result, the court erroneously determined both that Ingram waived his
constitutional right to a civil jury trial and that Hall held the incidental
authority to execute such a dangerous power.

177

Ingram v. Brook Chateau, 586 S.W.3d 772, 775 (Mo. 2019).
RESTATEMENT, SECOND OF AGENCY § 34, cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 1958).
179
See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury
Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV., 1 (1997);
Est. of Collins v. United States, No. 93-CV-70151-DT, 1994 WL 464357, at *1, n.1
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 23, 1994) (A dangerous power has been suggested to permit an agent
“unlimited discretion” over matter directly affecting the principal likely constitutes a
dangerous power. “A power to make gifts can be found in paragraph 12 of the
instrument only if that provision is read to grant the agent unlimited discretion in the
use of the principal's funds. Such ‘dangerous’ powers will not be inferred.” (citing
RESTATEMENT, SECOND OF AGENCY § 34, cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 1958)).
180
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848–49 (1986)
(“As a personal right, Article III's guarantee of an impartial and independent federal
adjudication is subject to waiver, just as are other personal constitutional rights that
dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal matters must be tried.”).
181
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy to Use of Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (“But,
as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver.”).
182
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972) (“For a waiver of constitutional
rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear.”).
183
Ingram v. Brook Chateau, 586 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Mo. 2019).
184
See supra text accompanying notes 180–82.
185
Ingram, 586 S.W.3d at 773; see also supra text accompanying note 152–53.
178
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C. A Path Forward
In matters of first impression, it is common for courts to look to other
jurisdictions for guidance.186 Faced with very similar factual backgrounds,
the Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court of Kentucky have held that implied
authority will not be inferred when an agreement is not a requirement of
admission.187 These decisions stand for the proposition that attorneys in
fact, absent express authority to enter into agreements, have the implied
authority to act only where necessary. The Supreme Court of Missouri,
for reasons left to speculation, declined to follow suit, and alternatively
held that attorneys in fact have the implied authority to act even when
unnecessary.188 From a legal perspective, this outcome is troublesome
because it is unclear whether the majority, despite its sua sponte
application of agency law, adequately applied agency principles, including
those of fiduciary duties. From a policy perspective, Ingram’s outcome is
concerning because it provides a gateway for attorneys in fact to claim
incidental authority for potentially careless acts. As a result, legislative
action may serve as an appropriate remedy in this case.
First, the Missouri General Assembly could amend Section 404.710.6
to require a power of attorney to expressly authorize an attorney in fact’s
power to enter into voluntary arbitration agreements. Second, the
Missouri General Assembly could alternatively amend Section 404.710.7
to expressly prohibit an attorney in fact’s ability to enter into voluntary
arbitration agreements altogether. Either option would successfully
incentivize careful execution of powers of attorney and ensure that an
individual’s right to a jury trial is not involuntarily relinquished via proxy.

VI. CONCLUSION
It is undeniable that arbitration agreements, mandatory or otherwise,
have become common practice. While arbitration can be more efficient
and affordable at times, it may not be the appropriate forum for all
disputes. In the present case, arbitration was compelled because Ingram’s
agent, a mere proxy, entered into an arbitration agreement on his behalf.189
The court had two logical rationales at its disposal to correctly decide
Ingram’s case: (1) Ingram’s power of attorney authorized his agent to do
only what was necessary, and the arbitration agreement was not necessary

186

See FIRST IMPRESSION, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, (last accessed Apr.
23, 2022), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first_impression [https://perma.cc/
4WVH-TV7W].
187
Ping v. Beverly Enter., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 561 (Ky. 2012); Pine Tree Villa,
LLC v. Brooker, 612 F. App'x 340 (6th Cir. 2015).
188
Ingram v. Brook Chateau, 586 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Mo. 2019).
189
Id. at 773.
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or required, or (2) interpretive and fiduciary laws prescribed by Section
404.714.1 and the Restatement (Second) of Agency govern Hall’s duty to
Ingram, and Hall’s agreement to arbitrate was a violation of those
principles. Instead, the court’s misguided approach incentivizes careless
action by both drafters and actors of the power of attorney. To limit the
erroneous effect of Ingram, the Missouri General Assembly should seek
to amend Section 404.710.6 to require express authorization for an
attorney in fact to execute voluntary arbitration agreements, or Section
404.710.6 to expressly decline such authorization. Doing so will cure the
haunting effects Ingram is bound to have.
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